Fischer: Europe’s Munitions ‘Cupboard’ is Bare

It’s a deeply sobering Wall Street Journal article titled “Alarm Grows Over Weakened Militaries and Empty Arsenals in Europe.” Here’s how it begins:

“The British military—the leading U.S. military ally and Europe’s biggest defense spender—has only around 150 deployable tanks and perhaps a dozen serviceable long-range artillery pieces. So bare was the cupboard that last year the British military considered sourcing multiple rocket launchers from museums to upgrade and donate to Ukraine, an idea that was dropped. France, the next biggest spender, has fewer than 90 heavy artillery pieces, equivalent to what Russia loses roughly every month on the Ukraine battlefield. Denmark has no heavy artillery, submarines or air-defense systems. Germany’s army has enough ammunition for two days of battle.”

M. President, the war in Ukraine has exposed just how serious our friends’ readiness and supply problems are.

Think about what I said. The largest defense spender in Europe has considered raiding museums for scraps of usable equipment. When it comes to heavy artillery, Russia blows through France’s entire arsenal every month. At least Germany is prepared to do battle — as long as the war doesn’t last longer than a three-day weekend.

Europe’s “bare cupboards” problem began many years ago at the end of the Cold War, when European nations began slashing defense budgets and drawing down troop numbers.

Amazingly, the dire situation today is actually an improvement from 10 years ago. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, the European Union has increased defense spending by 20 percent.

That’s not nearly enough, and it’s virtually nothing compared to our adversaries. Russia’s spending increased by 300 percent and China’s by almost 600 percent over the same time period.

European nations still rely on the military strength of the United States, which was responsible for 70 percent of NATO defense spending last year.

But last year, America’s defense spending was 3.1% of GDP, which is very nearly the lowest since the second World War. Even if you add aid for Taiwan, Israel, and Ukraine, America’s defense spending would still be far, far below 4.6% of GDP, the amount spent during the height of Iraq and Afghanistan operations in 2010.

Even though it’s on the lower end historically, increasing spending isn’t the US military’s only concern.

The past few decades show that we are unprepared to increase munitions production at the scale and speed to win a large war. In the Gulf and Iraq Wars, it took over two years for our munitions procurement and deliveries to reach necessary levels. And once these crises ended and demand for munitions dropped, we again sidelined production and cut our workforce.

We need to build up the weapons stockpiles required to deter or — if necessary — fight and win a conflict against a peer adversary. To do so, we must commit to sustained increases in munitions and weapons production. Tools like multi-year procurement authority for additional munitions — which we included in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act — can contribute to long-term stability.

This boom-and-bust cycle of production has put the United States dangerously behind adversaries like China and Russia, whose capacity to build and replace equipment far outpaces ours right now.

Take for example a wargame recently conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In the hypothetical scenario where war breaks out over Taiwan, China could replace lost naval ships three times as quickly as the United States.

And if Russia wins in Ukraine, it could rearm itself completely within three or four years. The nation’s finance ministry estimates that national defense spending will grow to 6 percent of its economic output next year — increasing by 2 percent. That 6 percent would be the highest level since the downfall of the Soviet Union.

The U.K. has gone the opposite direction. The nation hasn’t had a fully deployable army in over 30 years, and its defense spending is stuck at 2.2 percent. Britain has pledged to increase that number by a meager 0.3 percent — but only when economic conditions allow.

And unfortunately, industrial capacity will always lag behind spending. Even if Britain and the other nations of Europe massively increased defense spending today, it will be years before we see that spending translated into an increase in production capacity. By then, it could be too late.

Mr. President, a new axis is forming. Russia and China have pledged new levels of cooperation, and both have humming military production machines.

Our allies must invest more in their defense. They must prepare themselves for what’s coming. But they will not be alone.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted a weakness in our collective security. When the next crisis arises, NATO will be unequipped to respond. But we cannot allow our alliance to remain unprepared. Instead, we must make the necessary, sustained investments — and we must start making them now.